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Development
The New Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law
and Installment Sales Contracts
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the English chancery courts began to allow redemption of mortgaged property after default, creditors have looked for
ways to have real property serve as security free from any right in
the debtor to redeem it.' These methods of financing real estate
have been referred to as "creative financing" or "alternative
financing. "2
Statutory law in Illinois (or the lack thereof) has aided creditors
in this quest for non-redeemable security devices. 3 Although Illinois did not lack a statutory process under which a debtor could
effect a redemption after a default of a mortgage,4 there was not a
clear or concise definition of the instruments that were considered
mortgages and thus covered under the redemption provision. 5
The determination of which instruments were covered was, therefore, left almost entirely up to the courts.6 Courts often reached
conflicting results regarding very similar security devices. 7 Additionally, these decisions often were based more upon the practical
realities of a particular case than upon a ration al characterization
of the property interests in question.8 In this atmosphere of courtcreated rules and exceptions to rules, alternative financing methods, such as the installment sales contract, flourished.9
1. Cunningham & Tischler, DisguisedReal Estate Security Transactionsas Mortgages
in Substance, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Cunningham & Tischler].

2. R. KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW § 16.01 (8th ed. 1983) [hereinafter
KRATOVIL]. As one writer stated: "IT]he big idea is to finid a form of transaction that
will have the practical effect of security, yet will be held ;tot to be a security but to belong
to a wholly different jural species and so be held immune from security law." C anning-

ham and Tischler, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting
3. See infra notes 65-88.

DURFEE, CASES ON SECURITY,

4 (1951)).

4. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, para. 57, ch. 110, para. 12-119 (1985). See also infra
note 66 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.

9. Id.
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The new Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (the "IMFL") I°
was drafted, in part, as a response to this problem."' The IMFL is

a total rewriting of Illinois statutes concerning financing, foreclo-

sure, and redemption of real property.' 2 This article will focus

only upon one of these changes: the IMFL's treatment of installment sales contracts for land as mortgages. This article will not
address 3the many other changes which will occur under this new
statute.'

This article will begin with a brief discussion of the historical

and conceptual sources of mortgage law in general.' 4 The tradi-

tional installment sales contract will then be discussed; its uses,

operation, purposes, advantages, disadvantages, and theoretical
underpinnings will be addressed.15 This article will then analyze

Illinois mortgage law and its treatment of installment sales contracts prior to implementation of the IMFL.' 6 The body of the
article will focus on the IMFL's treatment of installment sales contracts and its effect on future installment sales contracts in Illinois.' 7 The article will conclude with an analysis of some of the
shortcomings of the IMFL and some suggestions for possible resolutions of these problems.' 8

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Mortgage

The term "mortgage," as it is used today, describes a transfer of
an interest in real estate from a debtor-mortgagor to a creditormortgagee to be held as security for the performance of an obligation.' 9 This obligation is usually the payment of a debt and is evi10. PUBLIC ACT 84-1462, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-1101 to 15-1706 (Supp.
1987) (effective July 1, 1987).
11. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
12. Liss, Introduction to the Proposed Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act, 9 ILLINOIS
FUND CONCEPT 13 (1985) [hereinafter Liss]. See also infra notes 106-08. A comprehensive discussion of all aspects of the IMFL is beyond the scope of this article. See Liss
supra (contains a summary of major changes under IMFL); Lindberg & Bender, The
Illinois Mortgage ForeclosureLaw, 76 ILL. B.J. 800 (1987).
13. See supra note 12.
14. See infra notes 19-42 and accompanying text. These concepts are essential for an
understanding of the theoretical distinctions that courts have drawn between mortgages
and installment sales contracts.
15. See infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 65-100 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 101-35 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 135-81 and accompanying text.
19. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.1 (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter NELSON & WHITMAN]. "A mortgage may be defined as a conveyance of land
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denced by a promissory note executed by the mortgagor. 20

A

mortgage is similar to a deed in that it effects a conveyance of
land. 2' Unlike a deed, howeve;', the modem mortgage does not

effect a sale of the land but only serves as security for the payment
of the debt.22 This was not always the case.
Most commentators acknowledge that the common law mortgage, as it is known today, originated in fourteenth-century England. 23 During this period, a land owner wishing to borrow money
(the mortgagor) executed a deed conveying legal title in fee simple
to the individual lending him the money (the mortgagee). 24 This

deed was subject to a condition subsequent. Upon execution of the
deed, the mortgagee had an immediate right to possession of the
property.25 If the mortgagor repaid the mortgage on a specified

day, known as the "law day," he had the right to re-enter the property and terminate the mortgagee's estate.26 If, on the law day, the

mortgagor failed to repay his obligation, the mortgagee's estate became absolute and the mortgagor had no further recourse.27
Although under the law the mortgagee had the right to posses-

sion of the mortgaged property, it became common practice to allow the mortgagor to remain in possession, with the mortgagee
taking possession only upon the mortgagor's default.28 Under these
given as security for the payment of a debt," R. KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW § 369

(6th ed. 1974) [hereinafter
20.
21.
22.

KRATOVIL,

24.

OSBORNE,

KRATOVIL].

supra note 19, at § 369.

Id.
Id.
23. G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF: MORTGAGES 8 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter OSBORNE]. See Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1890) for
a good discussion of the precursors to the modern mortgage.

supra note 23, at 8.

25. The mortgagee in possession was entitled to use the land and collect rents. Any
rents so collected, however, were required to be applied by the mortgagee to the outstanding mortgage debt. KRATOVIL, supra note 19, at § 370.
26. OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 12; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 1.2.
27. OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 12. It is unclear whether such mortgage deeds conveyed a fee simple determinable, see KRATOVIL supra note 19, at § 370, or fee simple
subject to a right of reentry, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 7. In any
event, it is safe to say that these transactions vested in the mortgagee all the incidents of
legal title to the mortgaged property. OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 9; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 7.
28. OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 12. See R. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
ch. 5 (1931) (discussion of the origin and probable reasons for this practice) [hereinafter
TURNER]. The custom of allowing the mortgagor to retain possession laid the ground
work for the modem "purchase money mortgage." A purchase money mortgage is created when a mortgagor's acquisition of the mortgaged property is financed by the mortgagee-lender. The mortgagee may be the vendor of the property or he may be a third party
to the transaction. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 1.1. In a purchase-money
mortgage, a mortgagee-vendor will execute a deed to the mortgagor-purchaser and the
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early mortgages, default provisions were applied very strictly and
formalistically.2 9 If the mortgagor did not perform his obligation
in a timely manner, the mortgagee became absolutely entitled to
the property and the courts would enforce this right without
hesitation.3 °
By the middle of the seventeenth century, however, the English
chancery courts began granting limited forms of relief to mortga31
'
gors in default. This relief was known as "equity of redemption.
The mortgagor's equity of redemption was premised upon the theory that the mortgagor retains an equitable estate in the mortgaged
property. 32 The court's recognition of this property interest is attributable to its acknowledgement of the mortgagor's actual interest in entering a mortgage transaction. Specifically, the
mortgagor's intention upon entering a mortgage transaction was
not to convey fee simple interest to the mortgagee, but simply to
provide security for the repayment of a debt.33 Thus, although the
mortgagee had legal title to the property, and the mortgagor had
defaulted on his obligation, courts of equity would allow the mortgagor to redeem the property if he could later repay the debt.34
Although the imposition of the equity of redemption provided
relief from the often inequitable results of early mortgages, this
right of redemption was not subject to any time limit within which
it could be exercised. Thus, the mortgagee constantly faced the
threat that the mortgaged property might someday be redeemed. 3
In response, the courts of equity created "foreclosure. ' 36 Upon a
mortgagor-purchaser will assume possession. The mortgagee-vendor simultaneously
takes back a mortgage for the outstanding purchase price. OSBORNE, supra note 23, at
387.
29. L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 12
(8th ed. 1928) [hereinafter JONES].
30. Id. at § 9.
31. TURNER, supra note 28, at 55-56. This treatise contains an extremely detailed
discussion of the nature and history of the equity of redemption and is acknowledged as
an ultimate authority on the subject.
32. TURNER, supra note 28, at 62. "At first the mortgagor's interest was looked upon
as a purely in personam right against the mortgagee, soon was perceived to be in rem, and
finally was regarded as an equitable estate." OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 16.
33. TURNER, supra note 28, at 63; OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 16.
34. TURNER, supra note 28, at 62. This right was recognized, although not widely, as
early as the mid-12th century: "When a man pledges tenements his intention is not to
grant an estate of inheritance, but to give security for the repayment of the money he has
borrowed and to redeem the tenements; and in such a case if he repay the money he can
enter." OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 14 (quoting Spigurnel, J. in Anon. v. Anon., 1314, 3
Eyre of Kent, 29 Seld. Soc. 85).
35. OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 20.
36. Id.
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mortgagee's application to the courts in which he alleged the default of a mortgagor, the court would order the mortgagor to pay
the outstanding debt, interests, and costs within a specified time
period or be barred forever from redeeming the property.3
Over time, the practice of foreclosure and fixed redemption periods became engrained in the law of mortgages.3 8 A general rule,
known as the prohibition against "clogging the equity of redemption," also evolved which prohibited parties from contracting away
the mortgagor's equity of redemption.3 9 A mortgagee wishing to
terminate a defaulting mortgagor's interest in a mortgaged parcel
of property, therefore, was compelled to bring a foreclosure action
against the mortgagor. The mortgagee could not terminate the
mortgagor's equity of redemption through agreements contained in
the mortgage or created contemporaneously with it.4° With the
exception of the installment contract, the courts' high regard for
the equity of redemption has continued until the present.
As the above discussion evidences, the mortgage, as it exists today, is the product of hundreds of years of tension between the
interests of the mortgagors and the interests of the mortgagees.4 '
The features of the modern mortgage are: its conveyance of an interest in land for security purposes, the mortgagor's entitlement to
possession of the mortgaged property, the equitable redemption of
the mortgaged property after default, and the termination of the
mortgagor's interest in the property only through foreclosure
proceedings.42
37. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 1.3. The practice of "strict foreclosure" entitled the mortgagee to clear title of the mortgaged property after the foreclosure
period ended. The actual value of the property in relation to the debt owed was irrelevant. Because the amount owed was far less than the value of the property mortgaged in
almost all cases, this process worked, in essence, as a forfeiture. See OSBORNE, supra note
23, at 20-21.
Strict foreclosure is relatively rare today and has been replaced by foreclosure by sale.
In a foreclosure by sale, the mortgagee is entitled to proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property equal to the amount of the debt owed. Any excess sale proceeds will go to
the mortgagor. If the sale produces less than the debt owed, the mortgagee may get a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at

§ 1.3.
38. These statutes, of course, vary from state to state. See JONES, supra note 29, at
§§ 19-68. For a discussion of Illinois law, see generally Mortgages & Foreclosures ILL.
INST. FOR CLE, 1980.
39. NELSON & WHITMAN,

40.
41.
42.

supra note 19, at § 3.1;

TURNER,

supra note 28, at 175.

supra note 19, at § 3.1.
KRATOVIL, supra note 19, at § 370.
The nature of the respective property interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee is
NELSON & WHITMAN,

still a matter of some controversy.

THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY

§ 4861 (1958).
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Installment Sales Contracts

To avoid the equity of redemption and foreclosure laws to which
mortgages were subject, sellers and lenders attempted to create security arrangements that would not be treated by the courts as
mortgages but would accomplish identical purposes. The most
successful of these creations has been the installment sales contract.4 3 Courts have tended to look beyond the form of many types
of transactions to find a mortgage in substance." Until quite recently, however, installment contracts have been immune from
such scrutiny.45

1. Elements of an Installment Sales Contract
The installment sales contract is the most popular form of alternative financing. 46 The installment sales contract has been charac48
terized as an executory agreement4 7 for the sale of real estate.
The parties to this agreement are almost always the purchaser and

the owner of the real estate to be sold. In essence, it is an absolute
contract to convey real estate at a future time, combined with a
financing and security agreement. 49 Therefore, it serves a purpose

similar to a typical purchase-money mortgage.50
The down payment required in an installment sales contract is
43. There are, of course, many other types of alternative financing methods including:
the absolute deed as a mortgage, the conditional sale, the sale-lease back-option to buyback arrangement, and the tri-partite consensual security transaction. Courts, however,
have often looked beyond these forms to find equitable mortgages and have foreclosed
them as such. Therefore, their status is much more settled. See generally Cunningham
& Tischler, supra note 1. See also OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 22-48; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at §§ 3.4-3.25.
44. Lewis & Reeves, How the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion Affects Land Sale
Contract Forfeitures, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 249, 250 (1975) [hereinafter Lewis & Reeves].
45. Id. at 250.
46. KRATOVIL, supra note 2, at § 22.01. The installment contract is also known as a
"contract for deed," an "agreement for deed," a "land sale contract," or "articles of
agreement for warranty deed." NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 3.26; Hess,
Terminating Installment Contracts in Real Estate Litigation, § 12-1 ILL. INST. FOR CLE
1984 [hereinafter Hess].
47. In re Estate of Martinek, 140 Ill. App. 3d 621, 627, 488 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (2d
Dist. 1986).
48. Id. The contract is executory because some performance is due by both parties
before (legal) title passes. Hess, supra note 46, at § 12-2.
49. Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 391, 394 (1966)
[hereinafter Power]. This arrangement is a "two party" transaction (i.e., it involves only
the purchaser and the vendor; no other parties, such as banks, are involved). Id. See also
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, paras. 8.21 (e) and 8.31, (1985) (these sections give the previous
Illinois definitions of installment sales contracts); see also infra notes 121 and 131 (definitions of installment sales contracts under IMFL).
50. Power, supra note 49, at 395. See also supra note 28.
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usually much lower than that required for the typical mortgage. 5'
Ordinarily under the contract, the purchaser will take possession
of the property and make monthly installment payments of principal and interest until the purchase price is paid.5 2 Generally, the
purchaser also will agree to pay real estate taxes, to properly insure
the property, and to keep the property in good repair. 3 The vendor retains legal title to the property until the final payment is
54
made, at which time full title must be conveyed to the purchaser.
The most distinctive element of the installment sales contract is
the forfeiture clause. This clause mandates that if the purchaser
defaults on his obligations under the contract, then all of the purchaser's interest in the property will be terminated. The vendor is
entitled then to retake possession of the property and retain all previous payments that the purchaser has made.5 Forfeiture has been
characterized as a drastic remedy because if a purchaser misses a
single payment under the terms of the contract, he will lose all
rights to the property and all previous payments with no right to
recoupment. 56 Forfeiture is a right that must be expressly given in
the contract itself."7 If the contract does not contain a forfeiture
51. Power, supra note 49, at 399, 407.
52. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 3.26. The down payment is nominal
and the monthly installments are probably the equivalent of rent for the premises,
although the installments represent payments on the unpaid balance of the purchase price
like an amortized mortgage. Henson, Installment Contracts in Illinois: A Suggested Approach to Forfeiture, 7 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2 (1957) [hereinafter Henson].
53. Henson, supra note 52, at 2; Hess, supra note 46, at 12-2. See, e.g., Vogel v.
Dawdy, 123 Ill. App. 3d 356, 462 N.E.2d 804 (4th Dist. 1984), aff'd 107 11. 2d 68, 481
N.E.2d 679 (1985) (If purchaser does not insure the property, as per the contract, vendor
may declare a forfeiture).
54. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 3.26. It is not uncommon to provide
that when the purchaser has paid a certain amount he will then be entitled to a conveyance and the seller will take back a conventional purchaser money mortgage. Hess, supra
note 46, § 12-2.
55. Kratovil, Forfeiture of Installment Contracts in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 188 (1964)
[hereinafter Forfeiture]. "Forfeiture of an installment contract involves several things: 1)
It involves terminating the buyer's interest in the land acquired by the contract . . . ; 2)
... a termination of a buyer's right to enforce the contract; 3)... [and] doing these things
in such a manner that it will enable the seller to retain all payments the buyer has made."
Id. at 189. See also Hess, supra note 46. See infra notes 68-95 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Illinois courts' treatment of these provisions.
56. Forfeiture supra note 55, at 190.
57. Realty Security Corporation v. Johnson, 93 Fla. 46, 111 So. 532 (1927). For a
more detailed discussion of the forfeiture of installment contracts in Illinois, see Forfeiture supra note 55; Hess, supra note 46; Rooney, Installment Contracts: The Illinois Perspective, 26 REAL PROPERTY 1 (October, 1980) (Published by I.S.B.A. section on Real
Estate Law) [hereinafter Rooney]; Gulitz, Buyer and Seller Protection in Residential Contractsfor Deed (Illinois) 69 ILL. B.J. 310 (1981); Jones, Drafting The Installment Contract, 62 CHI. B. REC. 97 (1980).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

provision, the vendor is entitled only to rescission.5" A provision in
the contract stating that "time is of the essence" is also included in
almost all installment sales contracts. 9
2.

Historical Background of Installment Sales Contracts
From their inception until the late eighteenth century, the installment sales contracts have been treated just like any other type
of mortgage by the English courts of equity. 60 Thus, if the contract
purchaser defaulted, he was entitled to the equity of redemption
and foreclosure proceedings. 6' This equitable treatment of the installment contract came to a complete halt by the mid-nineteenth
century. 62 At this point, courts began to allow forfeiture without
any equitable redemption period. Several theories have been advanced to explain this phenomenon. 6 Regardless of the reasons
58. People ex rel Smith v. Mersinger, 18 Ill. 2d 486, 165 N.E.2d 308 (1960); Hetterman v. Weingart, 120 Ill. App. 3d 683, 485 N.E.2d 616 (2d Dist. 1983). The seller
who rescinds must refund to the buyer the payments he made less the fair rental value of
the premises. Forfeiture, supra note 55, at 190.
By the insertion of certain magic phrases, the vendor can secure himself an
inordinate amount of protection and a position that is unique in the law. The
following provisions may be put into a contract (in fact, most of them are
printed on all contracts of this type), and the vendee will be completely
hamstrung.
(1) Time is of the essence of this contract.
(2) In the event of default by the vendee, the vendor shall immediately, upon
such default, have the right to declare the contract void and retain whatever
may have been paid on said contract, and all improvements that may have been
made on said premises and may take immediate possession of the premises and
remove the vendee.
(3) Any default shall cause all subsequent payments to become due immediately, and vendor shall have the right to compel the continued performance of
the contract by the vendee.
(4) Upon any default by the vendee, the vendor shall have the right to foreclose
the contract.
(5) The vendor shall have the right to use any and all of the above-mentioned
remedies.
(6) Waiver of any breach of this contract resulting from default on the part of
the vendee, shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any other branch.
Levin, Maryland Rule on Forfeiture Under Land Installment Contracts,. . A Suggested
Reform, 9 MD. L. REv. 99, 104 (1949) [hereinafter Levin].
59. Hess, supra note 46, at § 12-4.
60. Levin, supra note 58, at 108.
61. Id. At this time, "it was impossible for contracting parties to make 'time of the
essence' in executory contracts for the sale of land." Such provisions would automatically be deemed void by the courts and the equity of redemption would control. Id.
62. OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 13.
63. One theory suggests that this change was premised upon a policy pronouncement
by Lord Eldon stating that "notwithstanding what was said in earlier cases, time might
be made of the essence of a [land] contract." English courts have since relied upon this
statement in their enforcement of installment contracts. Another explanation for the re-
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explaining the change in treatment, nearly all jurisdictions, including Illinois, have treated the installment sales contract with a forfeiture provision as an instrument distinct from a mortgage and as
exempt from the equity of redemption or foreclosure proceedings.6
3. Treatment of Installment Contracts under
Previous Illinois Law
a. Installment Contracts as Non-Mortgage Transactions
Before the IMFL became effective, mortgage foreclosure was
governed by Article XV of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure,
entitled "Mortgage Foreclosure. '65 Statutory redemption in Illinois was covered by Article XII of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure in a subsection entitled "Redemption. ' 66 These statutes
defined "mortgage" as "every mortgage or trust deed in the nature
of a mortgage or67other instrument in the nature of a mortgage
upon real estate."1
newal enforcement of forfeitures was that it was an out growth of the economic climate
prevalent in that era. As one commentator explained:
The doctrine that equity will enforce forfeiture provisions in land contracts
where time is expressly made of the essence developed in this country during
the latter half of the nineteenth century, at a time when extreme ideas as to
"freedom of contract" were influencing American judicial decisions in every
field. It was a time when equity was decadent, when laissez faire was almost an
article of judicial faith, and when the courts were thinking in terms of freewilling individuals entirely able to look after themselves rather than in terms
either of classical equity or of a socialized law taking a realistic account of inequalities of economic position and bargaining power. In such an atmosphere, it
was easy enough to put aside the tradition that equity would not enforce a forfeiture except insofar as that tradition had been embalmed in direct precedents,
and to develop a line of decisions holding that contracts for the sale of land,
which expressly made time of the essence and provided for the forfeiture of all
payments theretofore made in the event of default would be enforced according
to their literal terms, especially where prompt payment of all installments was
made an express "condition precedent" to the purchaser's rights under the
contract.
Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion: II, 44 YALE L.J. 754
(1935).
64. Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract - A National Viewpoint,
1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 541, 542 [hereinafter The Installment Land Contract].
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-101 to 15-311 (1985) (repealed 1987). The
procedures under this article have been described as complex, cumbersome and expensive. Olsen, The 1985 Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act, 30 REAL PROPERTY 3 (1985)
(Published by I.S.B.A. Section on Real Estate Law) [hereinafter Olsen]. See also Liss,
supra note 12, at 14. For a discussion of pre-IMFA foreclosure law see Seigan & Helfgot,
A Guide to Mortgage Foreclosures,65 CHI. B. REC. 8 (1983); Real Estate Litigation chap-

ters 6-8

ILL. INST. FOR

CLE 1984.

66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-122 (1985) (amended 1987).
67. Id. at para. 15-103(a). Paragraph 15-101 stated that all mortgages were to be
foreclosed pursuant to the article:
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Because installment sales contracts were used as substitutes for
mortgages, it seems apparent that they should have been treated as
such under the statute.6" However, this was not the case. In Kelly
v. Germania Savings and Loan Association,69 the Illinois Supreme
Court specifically held that, absent a showing of fraud or overreaching, an installment contract does not constitute an equitable
mortgage70 and, as such, is not subject to foreclosure proceedings
or equitable redemption."' This approach, which Illinois courts
have frequently adopted,72 was inconsistent with Illinois courts'
otherwise liberal construction of the mortgage statute and imposition of equitable mortgages.73
The Illinois courts' general approach to installment contracts
appears even more inconsistent when construed with its pronouncements regarding the nature of the property interest conveyed to the purchaser upon the execution of an installment
contract. Until 1962, the Illinois courts held that no equitable conversion 74 occured upon the execution of an installment sales conNo real estate within this State may be sold by virtue of any power of sale
contained in any mortgage, trust deed or other conveyance in the nature of a
mortgage, but all such mortgages, trust deeds or other conveyances in the nature of a mortgage, may only be foreclosed, in the manner provided for foreclosing mortgages contained no power of sale; and no real estate shall be sold to
satisfy any such mortgage, trust deed or other conveyance in the nature of a
mortgage, except in pursuance of a judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction."
Id.
68. The Installment Land Contract,supra note 64, at 542.
69. 28 11. 2d 591, 192 N.E.2d 815 (1963).
70. The doctrine of equitable mortgage is based upon the principle that equity will
interpret an agreement according to the actual intent of the parties even though the instrument does not meet the technical requirements of the law. Trustees of Zion Methodist Church v. Smith, 335 Ill. App. 233, 81 N.E.2d 649 (1948). See also 4 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1161 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter POMEROY].
71. 28 Ill.
2d at 594, 192 N.E.2d at 815 (1963).
72. See, e.g., Burns v. Epstein, 413 Il. 476, 109 N.E.2d 774 (1952).
73. See, e.g., Landino v. American Nat'l Bank, 120 11. App. 3d 740, 743, 458 N.E.2d
1070, 1077 (1st Dist. 1983) (Substance and not the form of a transaction determines
whether an assignment of beneficial interest in a land trust is really a mortgage); First
App. 3d 54, 57 389 N.E.2d 52, 55 (2d Dist.
Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Pogue, 72 Ill.
1979) (Substance, not the form of the transaction determines whether a conveyance absolute is in reality a mortgage). See also DeVoigne v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 304 11.
177, 136 N.E. 448 (1922); Havana Nat'l Bank v. Wiemer, 32 11. App. 3d 578, 335 N.E.2d
506 (3d Dist. 1975).
74. Pomeroy has described equitable conversion as follows:
A contract of sale, if all the terms are agreed upon, also operates as a conversion
of the property, the vendor becoming a trustee of the estate for the purchaser
and the purchaser a trustee of the purchase-money for the vendor. In order to
work a conversion, the contract must be valid and binding, free from equitable
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tract." In the 1962 case of Shay v. Penrose,7 6 however, the Illinois
Supreme Court overruled the previous line of cases and held that
equitable conversion does occur upon the execution of an installment sales contract. 77 In Illinois, therefore, the installment purchaser is deemed to take equitable title to the real estate, whereas
the vendor retains bare legal title. This characterization of the
transaction has continued until the present. 78 Although the equitable conversion that occurs upon the execution of an installment
contract is theoretically similar to the relationship that exists between a mortgagor and a mortgagee, the Illinois courts, unlike
other states, have ignored the mortgage-like nature of the transaction and have denied contract purchasers the equity of redemption
which is accorded to defaulting mortgagors.79
b.

The Enforcement of Installment Contracts by the Courts

Illinois courts have relied heavily on the constitutional and legal
ideal of the "freedom to contract" in the cases upholding forfeitures in installment contracts.8 0 One of the earliest pronouncements of Illinois policy regarding installment sales contracts and
the enforceability of forfeiture provisions appeared in Heckard v.
imperfections, and such as a court of equity will specifically enforce against an
unwilling purchaser.
4 POMEROY, supra note 70, at § 1161. Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Brown, ch. 499, gives the
following definition of equitable conversion which has been quoted often and used:
Nothing is better established than this principle that money directed to be employed in the purchase of land and land directed to be sold and turned into
money, are to be considered as that species of property into which they are
directed to be converted; and this in whatever manner the direction is given,
whether by will, by way of contract, marriage article, settlement, or otherwise;
and whether the money is actually deposited or only covenanted to be paid,
whether the land is actually conveyed or only agreed to be conveyed.
Cited in Lewis & Reeves, supra note 44, at 256 (1975). For a detailed discussion of
equitable conversion and its relation to installment contracts see Lee, The Interests Created by Installment Land Contracts, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 367 (1965) [hereinafter Lee].
75. See, e.g., Capps v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 318 IlI. 350, 149 N.E. 247
(1925); Phenix Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 187 Ill. 73, 58 N.E. 314 (1900); Chappell v. McKnight, 108 I1. 570 (1884); see also Lee, supra note 74, at 373.
76. 25 I1. 2d 447, 185 N.E.2d 218 (1962).
77. Id. at 449, 185 N.E.2d at 219-20.
78. See, e.g., In re Estate of Martinek, 140 11. App. 3d 621, 488 N.E.2d 1332 (2d
Dist. 1986); Life Say. and Loan Ass'n of America v. Bryant, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 467
N.E.2d 277 (1st Dist. 1984).
79. See Lee, supra note 74, at 373; Lewis and Reeves, supra note 44, at 252, 257-58.
See also H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921
(1974), appeal after remand, 264 Ind. 77, 339 N.E.2d 57 (1975); Sebastian v. Floyd, 585
S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979).
80. See Aden v. Alwardt, 76 Ill. App. 3d 54, 394 N.E.2d 716 (3d Dist. 1979).
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Sayre."' In Heckard, the court upheld a forfeiture provision of an
installment contract stating that, although a court of equity would

not imply a "time is of the essence" provision and declare a forfeiture in a contract for the sale of land, if such provisions were contained in the agreement the court nevertheless would enforce
them.8 2 Therefore, although "equity abhors a forfeiture,"83 Illinois
a forfeiture provision if the parties agreed to it
courts will enforce
84
in their contract.
Although committed to the freedom of contract ideal, Illinois
courts have gone to great lengths to relieve the contract purchaser

of the harsh realities of forfeiture.85 For example, courts will not
find a forfeiture if no forfeiture provision is present in the installment contract.8 6 Furthermore, courts will not enforce a forfeiture
provision if the party attempting to enforce it does not follow the
procedure provided for in the contract.8 7 The courts also will construe strictly the terms of the contract against the party who is
attempting to enforce the forfeiture provision. 8
Additionally, the courts have attempted to find waivers of both
the forfeiture and "time is of the essence" provisions by vendors.
In one case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that repeated acceptances of past late payments by the vendor preclude a valid forfei-

ture. 9 In several instances, a court has found that the "time is of
the essence" provision had been waived by the contract vendor and
that he could not declare a forfeiture without first "reviving" the
provision. 90

81. 34 I11.
142 (1864). Heckard concerned a defaulting vendee under an installment
sales contract. The vendee attempted to tender a late payment and compel specific performance. The court denied the vendec's request and upheld the forfeiture provision. Id.
at 144.
82. Id. at 150. In reaching its decision, the court stated, "A court of equity has no
more right than a court of law to dispense with an express stipulation of parties in regard
to time in a contract of this nature where no fraud, accident or mistake has intervened."

Id.
83. See Aden, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 56, 394 N.E.2d at 719.
84. Heckard, 34 I11.
at 150. See also Eade v. Brownlee, 29 Ill. 2d 214, 193 N.E.2d 786
(1963); Lang v. Hendenberg, 277 Iil. 368, 115 N.E. 566 (1917); Dahm v. Jarnagin, 133
I11.
App. 3d 14, 478 N.E.2d 641 (3d Dist. 1985).
85. Forfeiture,supra note 55, at 189.
86. People ex rel. v. Mersinger, 18 Il1.2d at 489, 165 N.E.2d 308, 310 (1960).
87. Bocchetta v. McCourt, 115 Ill. App. 3d 297, 456 N.E.2d 907 (1st Dist. 1983);
App. 3d 359, 395 N.E.2d 212 (2d Dist.
Alabastro v. Wheaton National Bank, 77 Ill.
1979).
88. Alabastro, 77 11. App. 3d at 364, 395 N.E.2d at 214.
2d 131, 117 N.E.2d 82 (1954); see also Aden, 76 Ill.
89. Kingsley v. Roeder, 2 Ill.
App. 3d at 56, 394 N.E.2d at 719.
90. Fox v. Grange, 261 Il1.116, 103 N.E. 576 (1913). "Such a provision, once waived
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Another way that courts have attempted to mitigate the impact

of forfeiture clauses in installment contracts is to strictly construe
the applicable provisions of the Illinois' forcible entry and detainer
law9 and service of process requirements.92 For example, under

Illinois' forcible entry and detainer law, a contractor- vendor is required to give the contract purchaser thirty days to cure his default

before he files a "forcible" action. 93 Courts have held that if a ven-

dor accepts even partial performance during this time, the default
will be cured and the vendor will not be entitled to pursue a forfeiture.9 4 A final way in which the courts have attempted to deter

forfeiture is to hold that forfeiture is a mutually exclusive remedy.9" In other words, if the vendor seeks forfeiture, he cannot
seek any other remedy or damages. 96 Other remedies that a vendor
might seek, exclusive of forfeiture, are contract damages, 97 foreclosure of the purchaser's interest, 98 and recision. 99
The foregoing discussion illustrates the general disparity that exists in the treatment of installmen-t--ales contracts by the Illinois
courts. On the one hand, they seem bound to the precedents which
hold that installment contracts are not inequitable. On the other
hand, the courts seem quite reluctant to enforce forfeiture provisions and, therefore, have created many exceptions that preclude
or prevent the enforcement of forfeiture provisions. 100
must be revived by giving a reasonable warning of the vendor's intent to the seller."
Chrisman v. Miller, 21 111. 226, 236 (1859). See also Aden v. Alwardt, 76 Ill. App. 3d at
56, 394 N.E.2d at 719.
91. Il.. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 9-101 to 9-312 (1985); Forfeiture,supra note 55,
at 191. See also infra note 102.

92. Craft v. Culmeyer, 274 111.
App. 296 (1st Dist. 1934); Hinterberger v. Weindler, 2
Ill. App. 407 (1st Dist. 1879). See also Forest Preserve Real Estate Improvement Co. v.
Miller, 379 I11.
375, 30 N.E.2d 126 (1942).
93. It.. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-104.1 (1985).
94. Ferrara v. Collins, 119 III. App. 3d 819, 457 N.E.2d 109 (2d Dist. 1983). See also
Benjamin v. Allison, 201 I11.
App. 34 (3d Dist. 1915); Eddy v. Kerr, 96 I11.
App. 3d 680,
422 N.E.2d 176 (2d Dist. 1981).
95. Allen v. Borlin, 336 Ill. App. 460, 84 N.E.2d 575 (4th Dist. 1949); Dahm, Inc. v.
Jarnagin, 133 Ill. App. 3d 14, 478 N.E.2d 641 (3d Dist. 1985); 1st National Security Bank
v. Ward, 275 III. App. 521 (Ist Dist. 1934).
96. See, e.g., Allen v. Borlin, supra note 95.
97. Hooven v. Woodiel, 27 III. App. 3d 467, 327 N.E.2d 270 (5th Dist. 1975) (contract vendor allowed to sue for each payment as it came due under the contract); Anderson v. Long Grove Country Club, 111 111. App. 2d 123, 249 N.E.2d 343 (4th Dist, 1969)
(contract vendor may recover damages sustained).
98.

See infra note 123.

99. People ex rel v. Mersinger, 18 Ill. 2d 486, 165 N.E.2d 308 (1960).
100. A complete discussion of Illinois courts' past treatment of installment contracts
is beyond the scope of this article. For an extensive history of the judicial approach to
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III. DISCUSSION
A.

The JMFL

The IMFL was signed into law on January 12, 1987101 and its
Unlike previous Illinois morteffective date was July 1, 1987.102
gage law, the IMFL 0 3 was primarily created and drafted by practitioners active in the field of real estate law. °0 Prior Illinois
mortgage law consisted of piece-meal legislation scattered throughout various chapters and spanning well over 100 years. 05 The
IMFL was intended as a total revision of Illinois mortgage law
and consolidate as much of the applicable law
seeking to integrate
06
as possible.
All pre-existing mortgage foreclosure regulations were repealed
and replaced by the IMFL. 0 7 The Act is divided into seven
paragraphs roughly corresponding to the steps that a mortgagor
would follow in effecting a foreclosure. 0 8 This discussion will focus on the "General Provisions" t° and "Definitions" '" 0 sections of
installment contracts in Illinois, see Note, Installment Land Contracts: The Illinois Experience and the Difficulties of IncrementalJudicial Reform, 1986 U. ILL. L. F. 91 (1986).
101. Telephone interview with Illinois State Bar Association Legislative Office (Feb.,
1987).
102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
103. Public Act 84-1462, codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-1101 to 151706 (Supp. 1987).
104. Liss, supra note 12, at 13. The Real Estate Law Section Council of the Illinois
State Bar Association organized various committees which worked for over four years on
drafts of the IMFL. Id. Exposure drafts were then sent out to over one hundred Illinois
real estate attorneys whose comments and suggestions were then integrated into the final
draft. Id. These lawyers included representatives of borrowers, lenders, title insurers,
mortgage bankers, the secondary mortgage industry, general practice, and law professors.
Id. The final draft of the IMFL was then passed by the state legislature without significant change. Id.
105. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-101 to 15-311 (1985) (repealed
1987), 12-101 to 12-1401 (1985); Id. at ch. 29, para. 8.31; Id. at ch. 30, paras. 1-367.
106. Liss, supra note 12, at 14. The IMFL was drafted in response to a perception by
many that the existing foreclosure procedures were inequitable, expensive, unduly complex and "scattered among numerous statutes and case law." See also supra note 75.
107. "Sections 12-117, 12-118, 12-123 through 12-130, 12-151, 12-402 and 15-101
through 15-311 of the 'Code of Civil Procedure' approved August 19, 1981, as amended,
Laws
are repealed." Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act, P.A. 84-1462, § 7, 1986 Ill.
4408.
108. Part 1 - General Provisions ch. 110, paras. 15-1101 to 15-1107; Part 2 - Definitions id. at paras. 15-1201 to 15-1222; Part 3 - Mortgage Lien Priorities id. at paras. 151301 to 15-1302; Part 4 - Methods of Terminating Mortgagor's Interest in real Estate id.
at paras. 15-1401 to 15-1405; Part 5 - Judicial Foreclosure Procedure id. at paras. 151501 to 15-1512; Part 6 - Restatement and Redemption id. at paras. 15-1601 to 1605;
Part 7 - Possession During Foreclosure id. at paras. 15-1701 to 15-1706.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-1101 to 15-1107.
110. Id. at paras. 15-1201 to 15-1222 (Supp. 1987).
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the Act." ' These sections address the types of instruments that are
deemed to be mortgages under the Act and the types of non-mortgage instruments that must be foreclosed pursuant to the Act." 2
Section 15-1106, entitled "Applicability of Article," provides a
specific list of the instruments that must be foreclosed under the
IMFL."

3

First, mortgages"

4

created prior to or after July 1, 1987

11I.For a overview of all of the revisions that IMFL will effect see Liss, supra note
12; Olson, supra note 64.
112. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106 (Supp. 1987).
113. The section states:
Applicability of Article (a) Exclusive Procedure. From and after the effective
date of this amendatory Act of 1986, the following shall be foreclosed in a foreclosure pursuant to this Article:
(1) an" "mortgagecreated prior to or after the effective date of this amendatory Act

f( 1986;

(2) ai. real estate installment contract for residential real estate entered into
on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1986 and under which (i)
the purchase price is to be paid in installments over a period in excess of five
years and (ii) the amount unpaid under the terms of the contract at the time of
the filing of the foreclosure complaint, including principal and due and unpaid
interest, at the rate prior to default, is less than 80% of the original purchase

price of the real estate as stated in the contract;
(3) any collateral assignment of beneficial interest made on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1986 (i) which is made with respect to a
land trust which was created contemporaneously with the collateral assignment
of beneficial interest (ii) which is made pursuant to a requirement of the holder
of the obligation to secure the payment of money or performance of other obligations and (iii) as to which the security agreement or other writing creating the
collateral assignment permits the real estate which is the subject of the land
trust to be sold to satisfy the obligations.
(b) Uniform Commercial Code. A secured party, as defined in Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code muy at its election enforce its security interest in
a foreclosure under this Article if its security interest was created on or after the
effective date of this amendatory Act of 1986 and is created by (i) a collateral
assignment of beneficial interest in a land trust or (ii) an assignment for security
of a buyer's interest in a real estate installment contract. Such election shall be
made by filing a complaint stating that it is brought under this Article, in which
event the provisions of this Article shall be exclusive in such foreclosure.
(c) Real Estate Installment Contracts. A contract seller may at its election
enforce in a foreclosure under this Article any real estate installment contract
entered into on or after the effective date of this Amendatory Act of 1986 and
not required to be foreclosed under this Article. Such election shall be made by
filing a complaint stating that it is brought under this Article, in which event
the provisions of this Article shall be exclusive in such foreclosure. A contract
seller must enforce its contract under this Article if the real estate installment
contract is one described in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Section 15-1106.
(d) Effect of Election. An election made pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of
Section 15-1106 shall be binding only in the foreclosure and shall be void if the
foreclosure is terminated prior to entry of judgment.
(e) Supplementary General Principles of Law. General principles of law and
equity, such as those relating to capacity to contract, principal and agent, marshalling of assets, priority, subrogation, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentations, du-
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are now subject to the IMFL."15 Second, real estate installment
contracts meeting certain prerequisites must be foreclosed pursu6 Finally, certain types of collateral
ant to the IMFL. I"
assignments
of beneficial interests in land trusts, made on or after July 1, 1987
will be foreclosed under the IMFL." 17 Section 15-1106 also provides that two other instruments may be foreclosed under IMFL
procedures."18 First, certain security agreements which would
otherwise be covered under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code may be foreclosed. "9 Second, 15-1106(c) allows a contract
seller to foreclose any installment sales contract entered into on or
after July 1, 1987.120
B.

The IMFL and Installment Sales Contracts
The IMFL defines "Real Estate Installment Sales Contracts" in
language that is similar to previous definitions existing under Illinois law. 12 1 A contract will be construed as an installment contract if the purchase price is to be paid in installments, excluding
ress, collusion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause,
supplement this Article unless displaced by a particular provision of it. Section
9-110 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not be applicable to any real estate
installment contract which is foreclosed under this Article.
Id.
114. "Mortgages" are defined by the Act as "any consensual lien created by a written
instrument which grants or retains P-i interest in real estate to secure a debt or other
obligation . . . [including] . . . 'reverse mortgages' . . . mortgages securing 'revolving
credit' loans ... absolute deeds [in the nature of mortgages] ... and equitable mortgages." Id. at para. 15-1207. Compare this definition with the former, less detailed,
mortgage statute ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-103(a) (1985) (repealed 1987).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106(a)(1) (Supp. 1987).

116. Id. at para. 15-1106(a)(2).
117. Id. at para. 15-110(a)(3). This section appears to codify existing Illinois case law
regarding collateral assignments of beneficial interests. See Homey v. Hayes, 11 Ill. 2d
178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957); Quinn v. Pullman Trust & Say. Bank, 98 Il. App. 2d 402, 240

N.E.2d 791 (1st Dist. 1968) (both cases set requirements which are identical to those
under the IMFL). But see Melrose Park National Bank v. Melrose Park National Bank,
123 Ill. App. 3d 282, 462 N.E.2d 741 (1st Dist. 1984) (departure from the requirements

listed in Homey and adoption of a case-by-case analysis). See generally, Lindberg, Assignments of Beneficial Interests in Illinois Land Trusts As Security for a Debt, 70 ILL. B.J.
576 (1982); Levine, The New Mortgage ForeclosureAct and Its Possible Effect on the
JudicialSystem (paper published for seminar on IMFL given by the Chicago Bar Association, February 24, 1987) [hereinafter Levine]; M. Kenoe, Kenoe on Land Trusts ILL.
INST. FOR CLE 1978.
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106(b), (c) (Supp. 1987).

119.
120.
121.

Id. at para. 15-1106(b). See supra note 113 for exact language.
Id. at para. 15-1106(c). See supra note 113 for exact language.
Id. at para. 15-1214. This paragraph states:
Real Estate Installment Contract. "Real estate installment contract" means
any agreement or contract for a deed under which the purchase price is to be
paid in installments with title to the real estate to be conveyed to the buyer upon
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earnest money deposits, and title to the real estate is to be conveyed
to the purchaser122after the purchase price, or a specified portion
thereof, is paid.
There are two ways in which an installment sales contract may
be subject to the IMFL. The first is if a contract seller elects to
foreclose any installment contract under the Act. This is, of
course, not a mandatory provision and does not depart from the
existing case law. 123 The second, and more important, provision
requires that an installment sales contract be foreclosed under the
IMFL if it meets the following four prerequisites: 1) the contract
was entered into on or after July 1, 1987; 2) for residential real
estate; 3) the purchase price of which is to be paid over a five- year
period; and 4) the unpaid amount under the contract is less than
eighty percent of the original purchase price. 124 Each of these standards are discussed in detail below with an emphasis on the possible sources and rationales for each of the respective requirements.
1. Contracts Entered Into On or After July 1, 1987
The Act states that only installment sales contracts entered into
on or after the effective date (July 1, 1987) will be mandatorily
subject to the IMFL.' 25 Any installment sales contracts in existence prior to July 1, 1987 are unaffected by the IMFL and are
subject to forfeiture under pre-exisisting Illinois law. The IMFL's
prospective treatment of installment sales contracts contrasts with
the IMFL's retroactive treatment of mortgages. 26 Under the
IMFL, both mortgages created "prior to" and "after" the effective
payment of the purchase price or a specified portion thereof. For the purpose of
this definition, an earnest money deposit shall not be considered an installment.

Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at para. 15-1106(c). A contract vendor has always been permitted to bring
foreclosure proceedings against a defaulting contract purchaser. First Fed. Say. and
Loan Ass'n. of Ottawa v. Chapman, et al., 116 Ill. App. 3d 950, 452 N.E.2d 600 (3d Dist.
1983); 666 North Orleans, Inc. v. Kors, 11111. App. 3d 676, 297 N.E.2d 372 (1st Dist.
Dist. 1973); See KRATOVIL, supra note 2, at § 22.21(f).
This provision was instituted by the drafters because the IMFL foreclosure procedure
was viewed as fair to all concerned parties and allowing the contract vendor to foreclose
would avoid the additional issue of whether a certain instrument is or is not a "mortgage"
under the IMFL. Liss, Major Elements of the New Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law
(paper published for seminar on IMFL given by Chicago Bar Association, February 24,
1987). Note, however, that a literal reading of this provision would preclude any pre-July
1, 1987 installment sales contract from being foreclosed under the IMFL. See supra note
123.
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15.1106(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
125. Id.
126. See id. para. 15-1106(a)(1).
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date are subject to foreclosure pursuant to the IMFL.'"

2. Contracts for Residential Real Estate
Unlike previous Illinois statutes on the subject, the IMFL draws
a distinction between residential and non-residential real estate. 2
The prerequisite requiring foreclosure for only residential installment contracts thus implies that all non-residential installment
contracts will be unaffected by the IMFL. The basic language of

the definition of residential real estate has been adopted from a
previous Illinois statute although it has been expanded to a certain
degree. 129
3.

Purchase Price to be Paid Over a Period
in Excess of Five Years

The IMFL will be applicable only to those installment contracts

under which "the purchase price is to be paid in installments over
a period in excess of five years."'' 30 This provision was included to
distinguish short term real estate contracts from long term installment sales contracts.' 3' It is unclear how the drafters settled on
127. Id. One might wonder how mortgages entered into on July 1, 1987 should be
treated. There is, however, legislation pending that would amend the statute to read
"prior to, on or after... ". H.B. -0474, 85th Illinois General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1987).
This legislation also provides that foreclosures on file as of July 1, 1987 shall be accorded
pre-IMFL treatment. Id.
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1219 (Supp. 1987). This paragraph states:
Residential Real Estate. "Residential real estate" means any real estate, except a single tract of agricultural real estate consisting of more than 40 acres,
which is improved with a single family residence or residential condominium
units or a multiple dwelling structure containing single family dwelling units for
six or fewer families living independently of each other, which residence, or at
least one of which condominium or dwelling units, is occupied as a principal
residence at the time the foreclosure is filed either (i) if a mortgagor is an individual, by that mortgagor, that mortgagor's spouse or that mortgagor's descendants, or (ii) if a mortgagor is a trustee of a trust or an executor or
administrator of an estate, by a beneficiary of that trust or estate or by such
beneficiary's spouse or descendants, or (iii) if a mortgagor is a corporation, by
persons owning collectively at least 50 percent of the shares of voting stock of
such corporation or by a spouse or descendants of such persons. The use of a
portion of residential real estate for non-residential purposes shall not affect the
characterization of such real estate as residential real estate.
Id. cf ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110, para. 12-124 (1986). "The IMFA disregards artificial
distinctions based on whether the mortgagor is an individual, corporation or trust and
instead implements, more broadly than existing statutes, the public policy that homeowners are to be protected regardless of the entity signing the mortgage." Liss, supra note 12
at 18.
129. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.31 (1985).
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1106(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
131. Telephone interview with Jeffrey A. Liss, Vice President of IMFL Drafting
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the period of five years. A previous Illinois statute, however, contains a similar provision, 3 2 and Ohio's 133installment sales contract
statute also includes a five-year period.
4. Unpaid Amount Under Contract is Less Than 80% of
Original Purchase Price
Before an installment sales contract is subject to the IMFL, "the
amount unpaid under the terms of the contract at the time of filing
the foreclosure complaint, including principal due and unpaid interest at the rate prior to default [must be] less than 80% of the
original purchase price of the real estate as stated in the contract." 134 This prerequisite forms the basis of the IMFL's installment contract coverage.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND IMPACT

On its face, the IMFL is a responsive piece of legislation that
addresses and puts to rest many of the long-litigated issues regarding installment sales contracts and their status as mortgages. A
Committee (July, 1987). Short term land contracts, also known as binder or earnest
money contracts, are mainly used to hold the parties to an agreement for short periods
while they arrange for the closings. These agreements usually last from a few days to a
few years. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 7.21.
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.31 (1986).
133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07 (Anderson 1981). The statute states in part:
If the vendee of a land installment contract has paid in accordance with the
terms of the contract for a period of five years or more from the date of the first
payment or has paid toward the purchase price a total sum equal to or in excess
of twenty percent thereof, the vendor may recover possession of his property
only by use of a proceeding for foreclosure and judicial sale of the foreclosed
property as provided in section 2323.07 of the Revised Code. Such action may
be commenced after expiration of the period of time prescribed by sections
5313.05 and 5313.06 of the Revised Code. In such an action, as between the
vendor and vendee, the vendor shall be entitled to proceeds of the sale up to and
including the unpaid balance due on the land installment contract....
Id. Note that the five year period in Ohio is measured by the time over which a vendee
has been making payments under an installment contract, rather than the entire contemplated time span of the installment contract, as in the IMFL. Additionally, in Ohio, the
five year period is used as one of two disjunctive prerequisites for the imposition of foreclosure procedures, i.e. foreclosure is mandated if the vendee has been making payments
for a period of five years or more or if the vendee has paid more than twenty percent of
the purchase price. A conjunctive prerequisite would be when the purchase price is paid
in excess of five years and the amount unpaid under the contract is less than eighty
percent of the original purchase price. Therefore, the five year period in Ohio appears to
provide a certain amount of protection for the low-equity/long-term vendee unlike the
five year period under IMFL which provides no type of comparable protection. Durham,
Forfeiture of Residential Land Contracts in Ohio, 16 AKRON L. REV. 397, 400 (1983)
[hereinafter Durham].
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

closer analysis, however, reveals various practical ambiguities and
unresolved issues within the statute that will most certainly be resolved through litigation or amendatory legislation. Additionally,
the IMFL's installment sales contract provisions perpetuate the
theoretical inconsistencies that have plagued previous Illinois case
law on installment sales contracts.
A. PracticalProblems with the IMFL
The practical problems posed by the IMFL and installment contracts arise from the langauge of the statute itself and from the
factual situations existing under most installment sales contracts.
These problems, if not remedied, are sure to greatly impede
smooth and consistent application of the IMFL to installment sales
contracts in the future.
1. Calculation of Cut-Off Point
The first problem with the IMFL is its method for determining
which installment contracts are mandatorily subject to the IMFL.
As discussed earlier, all installment sales contracts in which less
than eighty percent of the purchase price remains unpaid must be
foreclosed pursuant to the IMFL. 35 This calculation is made "at
the time of filing the foreclosure complaint."'' 36 A contract vendor,
however, would not know whether to file a foreclosure complaint
until it is first determined whether the particular installment sales
contract involved is mandatorily subject to the IMFL. No clear
solution to this problem can be discovered within the IMFL. A
contract vendor may avoid the issue of whether a foreclosure is
mandatory under the IMFL and simply elect to file a foreclosure
complaint and carry out an IMFL foreclosure. 37 This approach,
however, simply ignores the problem and widespread adoption of
this practice would, de facto, make some installment contracts
3
mortgages.

Another possible approach for vendors under the current IMFL
would be to file a foreclosure complaint and then voluntarily dismiss it if it is determined that the vendee has not obtained the req135. See supra note 134, infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
137. See supra note 123.
138. Title insurers are very worried about forfeiture and if the IMFL installment
contract provision remains unchanged they may become more conservative in dealing
with land "previously" under installment contracts and require foreclosure to terminate
contract vendees' interest in all cases. See Hess, supra note 46, § 12.7; see also Note,
supra note 100, at 114, 119.
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uisite percentage. This date of filing would then establish a
concrete point at which the percentages previously paid by the vendee may be assessed. 39 The IMFL provides that a foreclosure
complaint made pursuant to an election "shall be void if terminated prior to entry of judgment." 40 Therefore, the initial filing of
a complaint would not raise any estoppel issues if the complaint
was subsequently dismissed.
There are, however, problems with this approach. First, the
IMFL is silent about who makes the determination regarding the
percentage paid by the vendee.141 Secondly, various time limits for
redemption and reinstatement rights are keyed to the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. 42 Thus, although a foreclosure
complaint is later voluntarily dismissed by the vendor, the vendee
might still be entitled to the statutory redemption and reinstatement rights before a vendor could pursue further action. Accordingly, it seems clear that the best solution to this problem would be
43
legislative action.
2.

Non-Retroactive Effect

Another problem with the IMFL relates to the applicability of
its foreclosure procedures to only installment sales contracts that
were entered into on or after the effective date of the law, July 1,
1987. As discussed previously, this non-retroactive approach to installment sales contracts contrasts with the retroactive treatment
accorded mortgages under the IMFL. 44 The treatment accorded
these instruments is indicative of several different intentions and
concerns on the part of the drafters. First, the drafters may have
been concerned that retroactively subjecting pre-July 1, 1987 installment sales contracts to the IMFL would invite litigation concerning the alleged impairment of contractual obligations in
violation of the contract clauses of the state and federal constitu139. Thus, the vendor would be complying with the letter of ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 15-1106(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106(d) (Supp. 1987).
141. See id. at para. 15-1106. Presumably, it would be the court. If this is the case
then substantial delay might occur before the court renders a decision. Thus, a vendor's
expectation of a quick resolution, through forfeiture, is thwarted.
142. See id. at para. 15-1502, 15-1603.
143. Such an amendment might take the following form: ... the amount unpaid
under the terms of the contract at the time of a default occurring under the terms of the
contract including principal.... "cf id. at para. 15-1106(a)(2).
144. Id. at para. 15-1106(a)2. This non-retroactive treatment conflicts with the
IMFL's treatment of other "mortgages." See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

tions. 14 The retroactive treatment of mortgages, however, would
also raise the same problems. 346 A second reason that the IMFL
does not apply retroactively to installment sales contracts is that its
drafters may have considered such a change to be too sudden in
light of Illinois' past conservative treatment of installment sales
contracts. 47 The solely prospective application of the IMFL
would thus provide for a transition period.
Although this prospective approach is arguably desirable for installment contracts that are mandatorily foreclosed under the
IMFL, the drafters also proscribed retroactive implementation in
connection with the optional foreclosure procedures of the
IMFL.' 4s This limitation on the application of the IMFL foreclosure procedures to post-July 1st 1987 installment sales contracts is
unnecessary. There appears to be no reason why the statute's foreclosure provisions should not be available to contract vendors who
voluntarily choose to follow the IMFL procedures. Because this
new system is viewed by the drafters as "balanced" and "fair to all
parties," 149 it seems quite inequitable to condemn parties wishing
to foreclose pre-IMFL installment contracts to a system that is believed by the drafters to be "cumbersome," "expensive," and
"difficult."150
3.

Residential Limitation

As previously discussed, only installment contracts for residential real estate will be subject to the mandatory provision of the
IMFL."5 I The application of the residential distinction to installment sales contracts is a legislative attempt to accomplish two
goals simultaneously. The legislature is attempting to furnish a
certain measure of consumer protection for transactions involving
small purchases of real estate. The legislature is also attempting to
maintain a certain degree of contractual freedom for parties in145. See, e.g., Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill.
2d 1, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985);
see also Levine, supra note 117, at 1.
146. See Levine, supra note 117, at 2.
147. See supra notes 66-100 and accompanying text. An Oklahoma statute draws no
distinction between residential and non-residential installment sales contracts. This statut has been cited as the cause of a rapid decline in the use of installment sales contracts
in Oklahoma. By creating the residential/non-residential dichotomy, therefore, the Illinois drafters may have been attempting to avoid a fate similar to that of Oklahoma for
installment contracts.
148. See supra note 126.
149. Liss, supra note 123, at 2.
150. Olsen, supra note 65, at 2.
151. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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volved in larger transactions. Several states that have adopted installment contract statutes also draw similar distinctions between
152
residential and non-residential contracts for similar reasons.
The requirement that the land must be residential property poses
a potential problem for farms that are purchased under an installment contract. 153 Farms are one of the major types of property
14
likely to be purchased under an installment sales contract.
Although "residential property" includes in its definition tracts of
agricultural property of less than forty acres improved with a single family residence, any tract which contains more than forty
acres is excluded. 5 5 In this day and age, there are very few operating farms of forty acres or less. The drafters claim that the IMFL
,hakes allowances for the "family farm" and would treat the farmhouse and forty acres of land as residential property and treat the
rest of the land as agricultural. 156 The statute, however, makes this
distinction only if the farmhouse and a forty acre tract of land were
purchased under one contract and any property in excess of this
amount was purchased under a separate contract. 57 In other
words, a farmer would need to set up two separate "mortgage"
transactions to cover a family farm of over forty acres. 158
There are two solutions to this problem. The first would be to
include "agricultural real estate"'' under the mandatory IMFL
foreclosure. A second solution would be to rewrite the definition
of "residential" to include family farms of a certain size and exclude any excess from coverage.16
4.

Coverage for Installment Contracts in Excess of Five Years

The legislature intended the IMFL to cover only installnient
contracts spanning in excess of five years in an effort to exclude
152. See e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01(B) (Page 19b1); MD. REAL PROP§ 10-101 to 10-112 (1981) (Both of these statutes draw a distinction
between residential or "non-corporate" property and other property. See Durham, supra
note 133, at 425 (discussing Ohio statute).
153. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
154. Power, supra note 49, at 403-08. See also Beuscher, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts-A Preface, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 379 (1960).
155. ILL. REV.STAT.ch. 110, para. 15-1219 (Supp. 1987).
156. Liss, supra note 12, at 18.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. ILL. REV.STAT.ch. 110, para. 15-1201 (Supp. 1987). This solution might not be
favored by large agricultural interests who do business on a much larger scale with "agricultural" property.
160. As the statute now reads, the entire property ("tract") is excluded from coverage
under the definition of residential. See id. para. 15-1210 (Supp. 1987).
ERTY CODE ANN.
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short-term binder contracts.' 6 ' Although this restriction will almost certainly exclude any short-term contracts from the IMFL,
the period is relatively long in comparison to the duration of the
average binder contract. 162 In addition, there appear to be alternative ways to preclude short-term contracts from exclusion under
the IMFL. 163 The best approach to this problem would be the
adoption of new legislation that would include a provision specifically excluding short-term binder contracts. As the statute now
exists, vendors could "draft around" mandatory IMFL coverage,' 64 and true installment contracts that are under five years
65
would be excluded.1
5.

"80% Unpaid" Cut-Off Point

The drafters' adoption of an "80% unpaid" cut-off point in the
IMFL 66 was an attempt to strike a balance between two competing concerns. The drafters attempted to assure installment sales
contracts a continued place in Illinois real estate finance and yet
mitigate the harshest results of their use. 167 The drafters did not
want to create a statute that would make all installment sales contracts the functional equivalent of mortgages. 68 Such statutes
have been said to cause the decline of installment sales contracts in
other states.' 69 The drafters also intended that installment sales
contracts used as "normal"
mortgages would be foreclosed pursu70
ant to the IMFL.
The "less than 80% unpaid principal and interest" cut-off point
is the amount, according to the drafters, which is usually given as a
down payment with a normal mortgage (i.e., usually twenty perSee supra note 130 and accompanying text.
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, at § 7.21.
See, e.g. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. 10-101(b) (1981).
See Durham, supra note 133, at 434.
See Durham, supra note 133, at 435 (arguing that a five-year requirement in the
of an Ohio installment contract statute is "senseless").
Durham, supra note 133, at 435.
See Note, supra note 100, at 113.
See, e.g. OKLA. STAT. TIT. 16 1lA (Supp. 1978) which provides:
All contracts for deed for purchase and sale of real property made for the
purpose or with the intention of receiving the payment of money and made for
the purpose of establishing an immediate and continuing right of possession of
the described real property, whether such instruments be from the dehtor to the
creditor or from the debtor to some third person in trust for the creditor, shall
to that extent be deemed and held mortgages ....

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
context
166.
167.
168.

Id.
169. See Note, The Decline of the Contract for Deed in Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 557
(1979); Ming, Contract for Deed-A Practical Prohibition, 55 OKLA. B.J. 3001 (1983).
170. Liss, supra note 123, at 2.
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cent of the purchase price is paid down).' 7 1 The Ohio installment
sales contract statute contains an almost identical cut-off of "20%
of purchase price paid."' 1 2 This figure was chosen in Ohio for the
same reasons as in Illinois. 73 Similar cut-off points, employing different percentages, also exist in other states as a result of case
law.' 74 Despite the adoption of such an approach by a number of
states, the drafters' assessment of the nature and amount of a "normal mortgage" is, and has been, a subject of debate.' 5 Furthermore, the eighty percent figure is unrealistic in light of the recent
studies showing that the average down payment
under a typical
76
installment contract is far below this amount.
B. TheoreticalProblems Under the IMFL
As discussed previously, Illinois has historically recognized that,
upon execution of an installment sales contract, an equitable conversio', occurs. 77 Although such a conversion places the vendor
and vetdee in an almost identical position to that of a mortgagee
and a mortgagor under a mortgage transaction, the courts have
denied contract vendees the right to equitable redemption accorded
to all mortgagors. 178 This theoretical inconsistency was a perfect
target for the IMFL. The IMFL could have resolved this inconsis-79
'
tency by making all installment sales contracts "mortgages."'
Rather than resolving this problem, however, the IMFL appears to
further frustrate it.
Installment contracts that fall under the mandatory provision of
the IMFL are not converted to "mortgages" despite their potential
foreclosure as mortgages.S° Thus, the IMFL perpetuates the view
171. Id.
172. See supra note 133.
173. Durham, supra note 133, at 399.
174. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, paras. 8.21(e), 8.31, (1985) (these sections give
the previous Illinois definitions of installment sales contracts). See also supra notes 121
and 131 and accompanying text.
175. Durham, supra note 133, at 435.
176. Durham, supra note 133, at 406.
177. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 79.
179. See, e.g. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § I IA (West 1986). See also supra note 163.
The major drawback to such an approach such as Oklahoma's is that it denies parties a
quick and easy way of terminating a defaulting, high risk, purchaser's interest in property. See supra note 169. Under the IMFL, however, termination of a defaulting party's
interest has been streamlined, See supra notes 106, 111. Compare this problem with
Oklahoma's rather complex and tim consuming foreclosure process. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12 § 686 (West 1960); see also Note, supra note 100, at 110.
180. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1207 (Supp. 1987). cf. id. at para. 151107(c) (Although installment contracts are said to be "deemed as mortgages," this is
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that installment contracts are distinct from mortgages and continues to favor form over function. In addition, by putting forth an
"80% unpaid" cut-off point, the drafters have created a second
"point of equitable conversion." There now exists equitable conversion when an installment contract is first executed and when an
installment contract reaches the "less than 80% unpaid" point.
This treatment appears to be totally contradictory to the theory
behind equitable conversion. One has either equitable title or not;
there cannot be degrees of equitable title. 8"
V.

CONCLUSION

After assessing both the positive and negative aspects of the
IMFL, it must be concluded that the IMFL may do more harm
than good in the area of Illinois installment sales contracts. On the
positive side, the IMFL has made some progress in recognizing
that at least certain types of installment contracts should be treated
as mortgages. The IM7L also provides a basic framework which
may be amended to resolve various inequities as they become more
apparent.
The negative aspects of the IMFL include the IMFL's confusing
installment contract language. Additionally, the standards that
distinguish installment contracts which must be foreclosed under
the IMFL from those which may be foreclosed are not deeply
rooted in either practical realities or theoretical rationales. Finally,
the legislature's pronouncement as to which installment contracts
should be treated as mortgages may affect the courts' continued
use of equitable principles to mitigate installment contract forfeitures under contracts not subject to the IMFL.
The best solution to these problems would be legislative amendments to the IMFL. Absent such action, the IMFL will in all likelil. ,od give rise to a patchwork of legislative acts and case law
decisions very similar to those that preceded the IMFL and which
it was enacted to eliminate.
VICTOR GRIMM

only for "the purpose of proceeding under the [IMFL] Article," and this provision appears to be included only for the sake of terminology.).
181. See Lee, supra note 74, at 375; Lewis & Reeves, supra note 44, at 258.

